Is the Veil of Ignorance Transparent ? by Giraud, Gaël & Renouard, Cécile
Is the Veil of Ignorance Transparent ?
Gae¨l Giraud, Ce´cile Renouard
To cite this version:
Gae¨l Giraud, Ce´cile Renouard. Is the Veil of Ignorance Transparent ?. Documents de travail
du Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne 2010.11 - ISSN : 1955-611X. 2010. <halshs-00469112>
HAL Id: halshs-00469112
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00469112
Submitted on 1 Apr 2010
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
 Documents de Travail du 
Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Is the Veil of Ignorance Transparent ? 
 
Gaël GIRAUD, Cécile RENOUARD 
 
2010.11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Maison des Sciences Économiques, 106-112 boulevard de L'Hôpital, 75647  Paris Cedex 13 
http://ces.univ-paris1.fr/cesdp/CES-docs.htm 
ISSN : 1955-611X 
 
Is the Veil of Ignorance Transparent?∗
Gae¨l Giraud and Ce´cile Renouard
December 22, 2009
Abstract.— Theories of justice in the spirit of Rawls and Harsanyi argue
that fair-minded people should aspire to make choices for society as if in the
original position, that is, behind a veil of ignorance that prevents them from
knowing their own social positions in society. In this paper, we provide a
framework showing that preferences in front of the veil of ignorance (i.e., in
face of everyday risky situations) are entirely determined by ethical preferences
behind the veil. Moreover, by contrast with Kariv & Zame (2008), in many
cases of interest, the converse is not true: ethical decisions cannot be deduced
from economic ones. This not only rehabilitates distributive theories of jus-
tice but even proves that standard decision theory in economic environments
cannot be separated from ethical questioning.
Keywords. Moral preferences, business ethics, social preferences, distributional jus-
tice, theory of justice, social choice, original position, veil of ignorance, utilitarianism,
maximin principle.
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1 Introduction
Rawls (1971, 1974) and Harsanyi (1953, 1955, 1975) have constructed theories of social
justice based on the choices that representatives should make for society in what Rawls
names the “original position”, behind a veil of ignorance that prevents people from know-
ing their own future positions. Rawls (1971) views preferences in the original position as
having a different nature from “ordinary” preferences for consumption, for risk or for the
distribution of social goods to others. Rawls specifies that the parties in the original posi-
tion are concerned only with citizens’ share of what he calls primary social goods, which
include basic rights as well as economic and social advantages. Rawls also argues that the
representatives in the original position would adopt the maximin rule as their principle
for evaluating the choices before them, i.e., making the choice that produces the highest
payoff for the least advantaged position. Being behind the veil of ignorance guarantees
that the conception of justice to emerge will be agreed upon in a fair situation. “Fairness
of the circumsntances under which agreement is reached transfers into the fairness of the
principles agreed to” (Rawls (1974)). Since these principles serve as principles of justice,
the veil of ignorance therefore plays a crucial role in Rawls’ construction of “justice as
fairness”.
In this paper, we shall consider the situation of a Representative who can face three
types of decision-making problem: (1) Behind the veil of ignorance, her preferences will
be called “ethical”;1 (2) in a risky individual decision problem (in front of the veil), her
preferences will be termed “risk preferences”; (3) finally, in a social choice problem (still in
front of the veil, since the Representative is assumed to know her position), her preferences
will be “social”.2
If Rawls and Harsanyi come to quite different conclusions about the form ethical
preferences should take behind the veil of ignorance —respectively the maximin and
the “utilitarian” criteria—, this is mainly due to their different view on the attitude of
people towards uncertainty behind the veil of ignorance. Nevertheless, both Harsanyi and
Rawls agree to view the original position as a purely hypothetical situation, a thought
experiment where ethical preferences are theoretical constructs that should conform to
some rationality requirements, paving the road towards various theories of justice.
By contrast, Kariv and Zame (2008) have recently introduced a framework encom-
passing both risk, social and ethical preferences, where they show that, under some as-
sumptions, ethical preferences in the original position are entirely determined by risk and
social preferences, i.e., by preferences that are not hypothetical at all. In other words,
according to these authors, preferences behind the veil of ignorance can be deduced from
preferences in front of the veil of ignorance. Since these authors view risk and social pref-
erences as being essentially arbitrary, they conclude that “there is no conceptual reason
to expect that moral preferences should be consistent with any particular notion of ra-
tionality —or theory of justice”. Thus, at variance with both Rawls and Harsanyi, Kariv
and Zame (2008) reach a conclusion similar to that of Hayek (1976), according to whom
social justice is a “mirage”.
In this paper, we challenge this viewpoint by reexamining the framework introduced
1Following Ricœur’s (1992, p.170) distinction between ethics as the aim of an accomplished life (teleo-
logical perspective) and morality as the norms related to a deontological point of view, we prefer here the
term “ethical” to “moral”.
2For a recent survey of the literature on social preferences, see Fehr and Schmidt (2006).
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by Kariv and Zame (2008). Starting with the same setting, but adopting different as-
sumptions (which encompass more classic preferences than do the assumptions needed by
Kariv and Zame (2008)), we provide an extremely simple proof of exactly the opposite
result: Risk and social preferences can be entirely deduced from ethical ones. Moreover,
we show by means of examples (see subsection 4.2 below) that many cases of interest
(such as the leximin criterion or utilitarianism) do not fulfill Kariv and Zame (2008) as-
sumptions but verify the axioms of this paper. In such examples, not only do risk and
social preferences follow from ethical ones, but the converse is not true: Ethical pref-
erences cannot be deduced from risk and social ones. Thus, we agree with Kariv and
Zame (2008) that there is a link between preferences behind and in front of the veil of
ignorance. In our view, however, the implication goes in the reverse direction: Theories
of justice cannot be reduced to descriptive theories (how people actually behave de facto)
but are indeed normative theories (how people ought to choose). As for risk and social
preferences, they cannot be reduced to descriptive rules of thumb either: They belong to
prescriptive theories (i.e., practical aids to choice) which follow from ethical decisions.
2 Choice environments
Following Kariv and Zame (2008), society consists of N agents, i = 1, ...,N , of whom
there is no loss of generality in assuming that the Representative is player 1.3 Three
environments are considered. In the first, termed the ethical choice environment, the
objects of choice are allocations of prospects for all members of the society, including the
Representative, but in a setting where the Representative does not know her position in
the society, nor the positions of others. In the second environment, called the social
choice environment, the objects of choice are (deterministic) allocations of prospects for
all the members of society, including the Representative. By contrast with the ethical
environment, the Representative in the social choice environment knows what her social
position will be before taking a decision. In the third, which we term the risk envi-
ronment, objects of choice are random individual prospects for the Representative. As
for prospects, they may designate a huge variety of items: utility levels, income, poverty
indices, etc.4
Choice spaces are formalized as follows:
• The choice spaceR in the individual risk environment consists of all lotteries,
that is, collections
(pjxj)j=1,...,K, (1)
where (pj)j is a probability vector
5, and each xj ∈ R is a prospect.
6 The
lottery (1) yields the Representative prospect xj with probability pj.
3In subsection 4.2, Example 2, below, an alternate interpretation of the indices i = 1, ..., N will be
proposed.
4Notice that nowhere do we require that preferences increase with respect to prospects.
5That is, pj ≥ 0, for each j, and
P
j
pj = 1.
6A prospect may be an income, a utility level or any quantitative characterization of an economic
situation. For simplicity, they are assumed, here, to be real numbers but prospects might take value in a
multi-dimensional space without impairing our results.
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• The choice space S in the social choice environment consists of all determin-
istic allocations xj (not to be confused with xj) in R
N . This allocation yields
the citizen i the prospect xji with certainty.
Let Perm(N) be the group of permutations σ : N → N . Given some vector x ∈ RN
and some permutation σ ∈ Perm(N), the composition xσ is again an element of RN
assigning prospect xσ(i) to individual i.
• The choice space E in the ethical choice environment consists of all lotteries
(
pσ(xσ)
)
σ∈Perm(N)
where (pσ) is a probability distribution on the finite set Perm(N) and x ∈ R
N .
This lottery yields citizen i prospect xσ(i) with probability pσ. In particular,
it provides the Representative with prospect xσ(1) with probability pσ (for all
σ ∈ Perm(N)).
In the risk environment, the Representative is simply a decision maker who must
choose a random prospect for herself. In the social choice environment, the Representa-
tive is to choose a deterministic prospect for every individual in the society. In the ethical
choice environment, she is to choose a deterministic distribution of prospects across so-
ciety but with the random assignment of individuals to places in society. This ethical
choice environment (with equal probabilities) coincides with Harsanyi’s (1953,1955) for-
malization of ethical decisions.
In the ethical, social choice and risk environments, the Representative’s preference
relations are written e,s and r respectively. In order to be able to shift from one
environment to the other, we need to consider a global set-up encompassing both E ,S
and R. Let us therefore denote by L the space of lotteries over allocations:
(pjx
j)j , (2)
where each xj ∈ RN is an allocation. The lottery given by (2) yields xj1 to the Represen-
tative with probability pj . Sometimes, we write (2) in the form (pjx
j) when the index is
clear.
Obviously, L encompasses the three environments mentioned supra. To see that R ⊂
L, it suffices to identify the individual lottery (pjxj)j ∈ R with the lottery of collective
allocations
(
pj(xj , 0, ..., 0)
)
∈ L. That is, identify R as the subset of S consisting of
lotteries that yield all individuals other than the Representative the 0 prospect with
probability 1. Similarly, S is identified with the subset of L consisting of degenerate
lotteries. Finally, E is identified with the subset of L consisting of lotteries of the form
(pσx
σ)σ with the property that x
σ = xσ for each σ ∈ Perm(N).
3 Deducing risk preferences from ethical preferences
Preferences will be characterized by two postulates. The first gathers hardly con-
troversial rationality requirements on global preferences  over L. Before stating them
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explicitely, let us recall the definition of compound lotteries. Suppose that L1, ..., LK
are K lotteries, and (pk)k=1,...,K is a probability distribution. Then, (pkLk)k denotes a
compound lottery in the following sense: One and only one lottery will be the prize, and
the probability that it will be Lk is pk.
A0 (i) Transitivity. The equivalence relation ∼ on L is transitive.
(ii) Reduction of compound lotteries. Any compound lottery in L is indiffferent
to a simple lottery, their probabilities being computed according to the ordi-
nary calculus. In particular, if (qk)k is a probability and each Lk = (p
i
kx
i)i for
k = 1, ...,K, is a lottery, then there is no loss of generality in assuming that
they all involve the same finite set, (xj)j , of allocations, and moreover
(qkLk)k ∼ (p˜jx
j)j
with p˜j :=
∑
k qkp
j
k.
(iii) Continuity. Given any collection of allocations (x1, ..., xK) ∈ SK , ordered
so that xi ≻s xi+1 for every 1 ≤ i ≤ K − 1, then every xi is indifferent in
L to some lottery involving only x1 and xK , i.e., there exists a probability
pi ∈ [0, 1] such that
xi ∼
(
px1, 0x2, ..., 0xK−1, (1 − p)xK
)
=: Xi (3)
(iv) Substitutability. In any lottery (pkx
k)k and for every i,X
i (as defined by
(3)) can be substituted to xi, that is:
(p1x
1, ..., pKx
K) ∼ (p1x
1, ..., piX
i, ..., pKx
K).
(v) Weak independence. For every probability (pj) and every pair of arrays of
allocations (xj)j and (y
j)j , one has:
xj  yj ∀j ⇒ (pjx
j)j  (pjy
j)j .
A0 (iii) is a continuity assumption on global preferences .7 Suppose, indeed, that
x1 ≻s x
2 ≻s x
3. It is plausible that the lottery (px1, (1 − p)x3) is preferred to x2 as p
approaches 1, and that the preference is inverted when p is close to 0. This assumption
simply says that, as p shifts from 0 to 1, there is some inversion point where the two
are indifferent. A0 (v) is a weakening of the familiar independence axiom, and does not
imply expected utility (even combined with the rest of assumption A0).8 Notice that we
require global preferences  to be neither complete, nor reflexive.
The next postulate concerns social choice preferences.
7Cf. Luce and Raiffa (1957), p. 27.
8Weak independence is sometimes known as the “sure thing principle”, and is essentially identical to
the game-theoretical principle that a rational individual will avoid using any weakly dominated strategy.
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A1 Convertibility. For every x, y ∈ S, there exist (z, σ) ∈ S× Perm(N) such
that
z ∼s x and zσ ∼s y.
A1 says that any pair of allocations in S can be converted into an auxiliary pair of
allocations related to each other by a permutation. Convertibility is implied by (but does
not imply) the following selfishness assumption introduced by Kariv and Zame (2008):9
B1 selfishness. x ∼s (x1, 0, ..., 0) for every x ∈ S.
Unfortunately, postulate A1 on social choice preferences is not satisfied by many examples
of interest (see subsection 4.2 infra). Therefore, we shall consider as well an alternative
postulate on global preferences:
A2 Reduction of lotteries. For every lottery L ∈ L, there exists a deterministic
allocation x ∈ S such that:
x ∼ L.
Theorem.— 1) For all ethical preferences e and for social preferences satisfying
A1, there is a unique global preference relation  on L verifying A0 such that
its restriction to E coincides with e. Hence, if  verify A0 and are such that
s satisfy A1, then both risk preferences, r, and social preferences, s, are
determined by ethical preferences e.
2) For all ethical and social preferences e, there is a unique global preference
relation  on L verifying A0 and A2 such that its restriction to E coincides with
e. Hence, if  verifies both A0 and A2, then risk preferences, r, and social
preferences, s, are determined by ethical preferences e.
Proof. 1) Since S ⊂ E , social preferences can be deduced from ethical preferences.
What we have to prove is that global preferences  over L can be deduced from eth-
ical preferences e (although, obviously, L is not a subset of E). Given assumption
A0(i)-(iv) on global preferences , they verify the following property:10 For any lottery
(pjx
j)j=1,...,K ∈ L, it is possible to find a lottery involving only x
1 and xK , and to which
it is indifferent. That is, there exists p ∈ [0, 1] such that
(pjx
j)j ∼
(
px1, (1 − p)xK
)
.
Therefore, for our purposes, it suffices to prove that the restriction of global preferences
 on simple lotteries of the form
(
px, (1 − p)y
)
can be deduced from e. Assumption
A1 enables us to find (z, σ) ∈ S× Perm(N) such that x ∼s z and y ∼s zσ. Given ethical
preferences e, let us therefore define global preferences by:
(
px1, (1− p)y1
)

(
qx2, (1 − q)y2
)
⇐⇒
(
pz1, (1 − p)z1σ1
)
e
(
qz2, (1− q)z2σ2
)
.
9To see that B1 ⇒ A1, consider z := (x1, y1, 0, ...0) and zσ := (y1, x1, 0, ..., 0). B1 implies that z ∼s x
and zσ ∼s y.
10See Luce and Raiffa (1957, p. 28).
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Clearly, global preferences defined this way will coincide with ethical preferences when
restricted to E , and hence with social preferences when restricted to S. On the other
hand, since global preferences satisfy A0(i)-(v), they are uniquely defined. Therefore,
their restriction to R yields a unique preference relation, r, in the risk environment.
2) Take two simple lotteries L1, L2 ∈ L of the form Li =
(
pxi, (1− p)yi
)
i=1,2
. By A2,
there exist x, y ∈ S with x ∼ L1 and y ∼ L2. Define global preferences  by
L1  L2 ⇐⇒ x e y.

Example 4 in subsection 4.2 will show that our Theorem is tight in the sense that one
cannot relax both A1 and A2 without impairing our result.
4 Discussion
An alternative approach to the whole issue would permit us to reach our conclusion
even more easily. It consists in completing the ethical space E by allowing for compound
lotteries. Notice, indeed, that E (as defined in section 2) is not closed with respect to
compound lotteries: If L1, L2 ∈ E and p ∈ [0, 1], then
(
pL1, (1− p)L2
)
need not belong to
E —but to L. Actually, adding compound lotteries to E yields the whole space L. Thus,
with such an enlarged ethical space, our result would be trivial since ethical preferences
e would already be defined on L. What this paper shows, therefore, is that, even if one
adopts a narrow framework where compound lotteries are not allowed to be part of the
ethical choice space, the same conclusion can be reached.
4.1 Deducing ethics from economic decisions?
The previous section provided fairly weak assumptions under which risk and social
preferences are uniquely determined by ethical ones. By contrast, we provide, now, a
somewhat severe restriction that will be shown to be equivalent to the opposite property,
that is, under which ethical preferences can be deduced from risk and social ones.
C Probabilistic self-regarding. 1) Let (pσx
σ) and (qσy
σ) be two lotteries in E \S
such that (pσx
σ) e (qσy
σ). Then, there exists a pair, (x˜σ, y˜σ)σ , of allocations
in S such that:
(
pσ(x˜
σ
1 , 0, ..., 0)
)
∼ (pσx
σ) and
(
qσ(y˜
σ
1 , 0, ..., 0)
)
∼ (qσy
σ).
Moreover, for each such pair (x˜σ, y˜σ)σ, one has:
(
pσ(x˜
σ
1 , 0, ..., 0)
)
r
(
qσ(y˜
σ
1 , 0, ..., 0)
)
.
Roughly speaking, condition C says that 1) every non-degenerate random allocation in E
is indifferent to some random allocation in R, and 2) when evaluating a random allocation
in E , the Representative does not pay attention to the way randomness affects citizens
different from herself. To put it differently, the attitude towards risk of citizens different
from 1 has no impact on global preferences. We view this as a particularly severe restric-
tion: How “ethical” are ethical preferences neglecting the risk aversion of the population’s
vast majority ?
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Proposition 1.— If ethical preferences, e, satisfy weak independence (A0(v)),
then the two following conditions are equivalent:
(a) Given r and s, ethical preferences, e, are uniquely determined.
(b) e verify C.
Proof.
(a) ⇒ (b). Suppose that (b) is not satisfied; we prove that (a) fails. Let us denote by
E ⊂
(
E \S
)
the subset of random allocations (pσx
σ) for which there exists (x˜σ) ∈ S with(
pσ(x˜
σ
1 , 0, ..., 0)
)
∼ (pσx
σ). Suppose that E 6=
(
E \ S
)
, and take (pσx
σ) in E \
(
E ∪ S
)
.
Then, consider two global preferences, 1 and 2, whose restrictions to R and S both
coincide with r and s, and such that, for some (qσy
σ) ∈ E :
(pσx
σ) 1 (qσy
σ) while (pσx
σ) ≺2 (qσy
σ).
Then, the restrictions to E of 1 and 2 do not coincide although both global preferences
are compatible with r and s. Hence e is not uniquely determined by risk and social
choice preferences.
Suppose, next, that E = E but there exists a pair of lotteries, (pσx
σ), (qσy
σ), with the
property that (pσx
σ)  (qσy
σ) and yet
(
pσ(x˜
σ
1 , 0, ..., 0)
)
≺r
(
qσ(y˜
σ
1 , 0, ..., 0)
)
for some al-
locations (x˜σ, y˜σ) ∈ S verifying
(
pσ(x˜
σ
1 , 0, ...0)
)
∼ (pσx
σ) and
(
qσ(y˜
σ
1 , 0, ...0)
)
∼ (qσy
σ).11
Consider the ethical preference, ∗e, defined by:
(pσx
σ) ∗e (qσy
σ) ⇐⇒
(
pσ(x˜
σ
1 , 0, ..., 0)
)
r
(
qσ(y˜
σ
1 , 0, ..., 0)
)
.
Then, ∗e 6=e although they are both compatible with r and s. Hence, given risk and
social preferences, ethical preferences are not uniquely defined.
(b) ⇒ (a). It suffices to define ∗e as above, and to conclude from weak independence
that ethical preferences are uniquely defined once r and s are given. 
Let us now recall the restrictions on social preferences introduced by Kariv and Zame
(2008). In addition to being complete, transitive, reflexive, and continuous (A0(iii)), they
need to verify:
B2 The worst outcome. x s 0 for every x ∈ S.
This requirement is specific to their framework as they impose allocations to take value
in RN+ . No such restriction is needed in our set-up.
B3 Self-regarding. For each x ∈ S, there is a t ∈ R+ such that (t, 0, ..., 0) s x.
Clearly, “selfishness” (B1) is a strengthening of “self-regarding” (B3). The two results
proven in Kariv and Zame (2008) that are of interest to us are the following:
11Recall that  need not be transitive.
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Proposition 2.— (Kariv and Zame (2008)) 1) For all risk preferences and
social preferences that satisfy B2 and B3, there is a unique preference relation 
on L verifying A0(v) and such that its restriction to S (resp. R) coincides with
s (resp. r). Hence, if  verifies Weak independence, then ethical preferences
e are determined by risk preferences, r, and social preferences, s.
2) If social preferences are selfish (i.e., satisfy B1), then  has the following
property: For all lotteries (pjx
j), (qky
k) ∈ L,
(pjx
j)j  (qky
k)k ⇐⇒
(
pj(x
j
1, 0, ..., 0)
)
j
r
(
qk(y
k
1 , 0, ..., 0)
)
k
.
It is easily shown that, if A0(v), B2 and B3 are fulfilled, so is C. Hence, Part 1 of
Proposition 2 follows from Part 2 of our Proposition 1. The second part of Proposition 2
says that, if the Representative is perfectly selfish (in the sense of B1) in the social choice
environment, then preferences in the risk environment coincide with ethical preferences.
Given the widespread use of expected utility as a formalization of risk preferences, this
seems to promote a definition of ethical preferences as being given by the expected utility
of random allocations xσ for σ ∈ Perm(N):
U
[
(pσx
σ)
]
:=
∑
σ
pσ
∑
i
λixσ(i). (4)
Notice, however, that Proposition 2 is hardly compatible with (4) since this criterion does
not verify selfishness B1 unless the weights (λi)i attributed to citizens are λ1 > 0 and
λi = 0 for every i 6= 1 —in which case (4) simply reduces to dictatorship. Nor would
(4) fulfill B1 once prospects are allowed to take values that are unbounded from below.
Whether (4) can be understood in terms of Harasanyi’s “utilitarian ethics” is discussed
below in Example 2.
4.2 Examples
The first three examples satisfy our axioms but fail to verify C (hence the assumptions
adopted by Kariv and Zame (2008) as well). The last example shows that our main result
fails if neither A1 nor A2 obtain.
Example 1. The Maximin criterion (both with respect to risk and with respect to
citizens) can be defined by the global utility function on L:
M
(
(pkx
k)k
)
:= min
k,i
xki . (5)
It fulfillsA0 and A2 but fails to verify B2, B3 (hence B1), A1 and C.12 Moreover, ethical
preferences e cannot be deduced from risk, r, and social preferences s. Indeed, the
restriction of (5) to allocations of the form (x1, 0, ..., 0) yields a constant mapping, so
that risk preferences are trivial. On the other hand, consider the auxiliary global utility
function:
12This would be true also for Leximin preferences as well.
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N
(
(pkx
k)k
)
:= min
{
min
k
xk1 ; min
i6=1
∑
k
pkxki
}
. (6)
The restriction of (6) to R and S yields the same risk and social preferences as (5), while
the restrictions of both global utilites to the ethical environment, E , are distinct. Hence,
ethical preferences cannot be deduced from r and s.
Following Harsanyi (1975, 1978), one has argued that the risk preferences induced
by (5) in the R setting are hardly realistic. Quite on the contrary, both theoretical
investigations (see, e.g., Artzner et al. (1999)) and empirical practices of stress tests in
the financial industry suggest that behaviors at least close to the ones dictated by (5)
are not relegated to exotic matters, even in the highly specific set-up of individual risk.
Similarly, Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) have reintroduced the maximin principle within
decision theory in face of uncertainty. On the (deterministic) social choice side, such an
egalitarian criterion has been strongly advocated by Fleurbaye and Maniquet (2006) in a
purely ordinal setting.
Example 2. Consider lotteries involving at most K ≥ 2 allocations,13 (xk)k, ordered
so that pk+1 ≤ pk for k = 1, ...,K − 1. A criterion akin to some kind of “utilitarianism”
(again, both with respect to risk and to citizens) can be defined by:
U
(
(pkx
k)k
)
:=
∑
k
pk
∑
i
λki x
k
i , (7)
with λki ∈ R. This alternate criterion fulfills A0 and A2 but fails to verify B1, B2 and
A1. Moreover, when the individual weights λki depend upon k in a non-trivial way, C is
not satisfied either, so that ethical preferences e cannot be deduced from risk r and
social s preferences. Indeed, neither r nor s depend upon λ
k
i for k ≥ 2 and i ≥ 2.
On the side of individual risk, (7) corresponds to risk-neutrality which is widely used for
pricing and hedging financial derivatives. On the side of social choice, it has received an
axiomatic foundation by Mertens and Dhillon (1999).
There has been considerable controversy over “utilitarian ethics” in the way it is
defended by Harsanyi, as in the debate between Sen (1976, 1977, 1986) and Harsanyi
(1975, 1977a). Here, when pσ = 1/N ! for each permutation σ ∈ Perm(N), our frame-
work becomes compatible with Harsanyi’s (1975) “equi-probability model of moral value
judgments”. To see this point, recall that, in Harsanyi’s (1978) view, the Representa-
tive “would certainly satisfy our impartiality and impersonality requirements if he did
not know how his choice between [lotteries] A and B would affect him personally and,
in particular, if he did not know what his own social position would be in situations A
and B”. Thus, the Representative is assumed to think that in either (randomly selected)
situation he would have the same probability 1/N to occupy any one of the N possible
social positions. Therefore, in Harsanyi (1978), the Representative does not even know
her own risk preferences, as these preferences are attached to the position she will occupy,
while, here, a lottery in E involves various random prospects to individuals i = 1, ...,N
(including the Representative) knowing her own, fixed, risk preferences, ir.
Nevertheless, our approach is broad enough to encompass Harsanyi’s set-up as a par-
ticular case of ours: Suppose that the index i = 1, ...,N does not label individuals but
“social positions”, which may be occupied by every individual. Take L = 1 and suppose
13We know from the proof of the Theorem that this involves no loss of generality.
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that each position i = 1, ...,N is identified with a given utility function: Ui : A → R
defined on some auxiliary space, A, of random situations, (pkA
k)k. An allocation of
prospects, (xi)i ∈ R
N , is now a N -tuple of utility levels (Ui(A))i, derived from any ran-
dom situation A ∈ A.14 Restrict E to equiprobable lotteries, (pσx
σ)σ∈Perm(N), of size N !,
with pσ = 1/N !, every σ. By construction, a form of “selfishness” is implicit in Harsanyi’s
framework since, whatever being her position i, the Representative only cares about her
own individual risk preferences, Ui, associated to this very position, and not about the
preferences of the other citizens occupying different positions — so that B1, now, makes
sense. Within this specific set-up, Proposition 2-2 provides a first step towards Harsanyi’s
conslusion. It suffices, indeed, to complete the assumptions needed for Proposition 2-2 by
any axiomatics which characterizes individual risk preferences in terms of expected utility
in order to get:
UH
[
(pσx
σ)
]
:=
1
N !
∑
σ
xσ(1)
=
1
N
∑
i
xi
=
1
N
∑
i
Ui(A).
The advantage of this reformulation is to illuminate the role of the selfishness requirement
B1 underlying this “utilitarian”15 appproach of ethics.16
Example 3. (Kariv and Zame (2008)) Take N = 2. Let g : R → R be any continuous,
strictly increasing function with the property that g(t) = t for t ≤ 0. Define the global
utility function Wg : L → R by:
Wg
(
p1(x1, y1), p2(x2, y2)
)
:= p1g
(
−ex1 + y1
)
+ p2g
(
−ex2 + y2
)
,
for any simple lottery in L involving only two allocations (x1, y1) and (x2, y2) with p1 ≥
p2.
17 The restriction of Wg on R does not depend on g since g(t) = t for t ≤ 0. The social
preferences induced by Wg on S do not depend upon g because g is strictly increasing.
However, the ethical preferences induces byWg on E do depend on g: The weight given to
inequality between citizens depends on g. Hence, ethical preferences cannot be deduced
from risk and social choice preferences, so that Proposition 1 above fails. This is due
to the failure of B2: Preferences induced by Wg on S are not self-regarding. Neither
are they probabilistically self-regarding, so that C is, in turn, violated. By contrast, the
intermediate value theorem ensures that Wg verifies A2, while A0 is obvious. Hence, our
Theorem holds in this setting.
14Admittedly, this construction involves interpersonal utility comparisons —which is consistent with
Harsanyi’s (1977b, 1978) claim that “there are non valid arguments against such comparisons”. Though
we do believe that there are valid arguments against intersubjective comparisons (whose discussion would
go beyond the scope of this paper and is abundantly illustrated in the litterature), it is only fair to permit
them in order to characterize Harsanyi’s setting as a particular instance of ours.
15Quotation marks, here, wish to emphasize that Harsanyi’s terminology does not reflect the much
broader standpoint of, say, John Stuart Mill (1861), for whom “utilitarianism” also encompasses non-self-
oriented behaviors (e.g., the Biblical Golden rule) which obviously contradict B1.
16See the discussion of (4) supra.
17By the same argument as in the proof of our Theorem, it suffices to consider such simple lotteries.
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Example 4. Again, take N = 2. Let f : R → R be continuous, strictly increasing with
the property that f(t) = t whenever t ≥ 0. Define the global utility function Uf,λ : L → R
as follows. For every lottery L =
(
p1(x1, y1), p2(x2, y2)
)
with p1 ≥ p2:
Uf,λ(L) := p1f(|x1| − y1) + p2λf
(
max
i=1,2
|xi − yi| − min
i=1,2
|xi − yi|
)
,
for a given parameter λ ∈ R \ {0}. The risk preferences induced by Uf,λ on R reduce to
Uf,λ(L) = p1f(|x1|) + p2λf
(
max
i=1,2
|xi| − min
i=1,2
|xi|
)
,
for every L :=
(
p1(x1, 0), p2(x2, 0)
)
and do not depend on f (as f(t) = t for t ≥ 0). Nor do
social choice preferences since, for every allocation (x1, y1) ∈ S, Uf,λ(x1, y1) = f(|x1|−y1),
and f is strictly increasing. However, the ethical preferences induced by Uf,λ on E do
depend on f , again because the weight given to inequality depends upon f . Thus, ethical
preferences cannot be deduced from risk and social choice preferences. This time, it is
B1 that fails: There is no worst outcome. On the other hand, that C is not satisfied
is obvious. At variance with Example 3, however, Uf,λ does not verify our convertibility
assumption A1. Similarly, Uf,λ does not satisfy A2 in general, so that our Theorem fails
as well. Indeed, for every allocation z = (x, y), Uf,λ
(
pz, (1−p)zσ
)
= pf(|x|−y) whatever
being the probability p ∈ (0, 1] with p ≥ 1−p.18 Hence, ethical preferences do not depend
upon λ, while global preferences do. In particular, risk preferences depend upon λ, and
hence, cannot be deduced from ethical ones.
4.3 Ethics and economic decisions
How realistic is our conclusion that ethical preferences cannot be deduced from every-
day behavior on the economic field? Many contemporary “utilitarians” have claimed that
voting for the maximin principle is only optimal for infinitely risk averse Representatives.
This argument takes as granted that each person is only interested in her own material
payoff —not surprisingly, this is exactly assumption B1— and claims that it is legitimate
to disregard the Maximin principle on the ground that people’s everyday behavior does
not fit with infinite risk-aversion. This presupposes exactly what this paper challenges,
namely that ethical preferences can be deduced from risk preferences.
However, Ho¨risch (2007) has implemented the Rawlsian thought experiment of a veil
of ignorance as a laboratory experiment. There, it is found that both men and women
react to the risk introduced by the veil of ignorance ina way that is significantly distinct
from their attitude towards risk in front of the veil. Women additionally exhibit social
preferences that reflect an increased concern for equality. These findings confirm the main
message of the present paper. Indeed, if people have social preferences that do not satisfy
B1, they can be in favor of an egalitarian distribution even if they are, say, risk-neutral.
Conversly, one could question the “realism” of our assertion that economic decisions
are influenced by ethical convictions. In fact, ethical views influence investor as well as
consumer choices, not only at the time of presbyterian pietism studied in Weber’s (1904)
celebrated monograph, but also today. For example, in 2006, the UN launched an initia-
tive called “Principles for Responsible Investments”:19 The asset owners and investment
18Here, σ denotes the unique non-trivial permutation over {1, 2}.
19See http://www.unpri.org.
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managers who sign the six principles commit themselves to integrate ESG (environmental,
social and governance) criteria in their investment decisions. By May 2008, 362 investors
had signed these principles, representing 14.4 trillion dollars of investments. Fair Trade is
also an alternative way of doing business that seeks to build equitable, long-term partner-
ships between consumers in Europe, Japan, Australia, New Zealand and North America
together with producers in developing regions. The global Fair Trade sales in 2007 are
worth 2.65 billion euros. The highest market penetration is Switzerland where the average
consumer annually spends more than 21 euros on Fair Trade products.20
Finally, current initiatives in favour of social business (Yunus (2008)) express the will
of entrepreneurs to endorse new economic models centered on the needs of the poor, even
if these actions are less profitable than conventional businesses.
Let us conclude with a final remark. Nussbaum (2006, p. 17) criticizes the social con-
tract theorists, and Rawls among them, in as much as they see the society as a contract
for mutual advantage between people who are free, equal and independent. This perspec-
tive does not take into account people who suffer from impairments or disabilities. Even
though we agree with Nussbaum’s criticism, we did not address the issue in this paper:
The parties behind the veil of ignorance do not possess any serious physical or mental
impairments that would prevent them from exhibiting “preference” relations fulfilling A0
and either A1 or A2. However, the citizens for whom they design principles could suffer
from such disabilities.
Gae¨l Giraud, CNRS, Paris School of Economics, gael.giraud@parisschoolofeconomics.eu.
Ce´cile Renouard, ESSEC Business School, Paris, renouard@essec.fr.
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